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Executive Summary 
The management of multilateral negotiations plays a crucial role in attaining global 
cooperation.  
The 2009 Conference of Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen, which aimed to deliver a 
first-ever comprehensive global climate deal, ended without agreement in part 
because of poor management of the negotiations by the Danish host and the UNFCCC 
Secretariat. Significantly altered management practices a year later at COP16 in 
Cancun, Mexico, were a major factor in an agreement being reached. Compromises 
made at the previous summit in Copenhagen, which provided a framework for 
agreement, also played a significant role. The power distribution between different 
parties and their interests remained mostly constant, so had less influence on the 
different outcomes at the Copenhagen and Cancún summits.  
This policy paper looks at the significance of negotiations management for achieving 
successful negotiation outcomes by analysing evidence from 55 confidential 
interviews with senior negotiators from all coalitions involved in the UNFCCC 
process, high-level UN officials, lead host organisers and summit observers.   
The evidence suggests that the COP Presidency and UNFCCC Secretariat can 
make an important contribution to achieving a successful negotiation outcome 
by:  
• Creating a transparent and inclusive process. Transparency and inclusivity
are crucial to ensure that all parties understand the negotiation process and its
content. This enhances their ability to contribute and to compromise. It also
reduces the possibility that parties attempt to obstruct negotiations because of
procedural issues. Transparency and inclusivity also encourage all parties to
feel they are being treated with respect by the organisers.
• Ensuring the capabilities of the organising institutions and individuals.
Organisational cohesion within and between the Presidency and the UNFCCC
Secretariat plays a key role in successful COPs. Individuals with key
organisational roles, for example the President, the Head of the UNFCCC
Secretariat and their advisors, must have expert understanding of the
negotiation process, as well as being skilled networkers and communicators.
This enables them to navigate complex negotiations more effectively and
widens their access to delegates.
• Securing broad acceptance of the COP President from key negotiators.
Building acceptance and trust in the authority of the COP President engenders
a sense of goodwill among parties and empowers the President with sufficient
leeway to take crucial decisions.  It also reduces the potential for parties to
block decisions.
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• Enabling constructive arguing. Building a sense of trust towards the 
organisers and among the parties involved, and providing informal negotiation 
spaces enables constructive arguing. Organisers from host nations and the 
UNFCCC Secretariat can thereby facilitate constructive arguing that lets 
negotiators from different parties mutually reveal information about the 
interests that underlie their positions and provide a rationale for possible 
solutions. By doing so, constructive arguing allows those involved in 
negotiations to consider interests more comprehensively and to craft a deal 
that is acceptable to all. It can also make parties more amenable to new 
solutions and compromises.    
 
The author can provide more detail on these results (email:k.monheim@lse.ac.uk), as 
does the book by Kai Monheim (November, 2014), How Effective Negotiation 
Management Promotes Multilateral Cooperation: The Power of Process in Climate, 
Trade, and Biosafety Negotiations, Routledge.  
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Introduction 
 
This policy paper outlines how effective negotiation management contributes to 
reaching agreement at multilateral climate change negotiations.  
It focuses on the UNFCCC climate change negotiations – the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) and preparatory negotiations - during the Danish and Mexican 
presidencies in 2009 and 2010.  
The paper summarises the policy-relevant results of a three-year research project on 
multilateral negotiations at the Department of International Relations at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science and its Grantham Research Institute on 
Climate Change and the Environment, which provided generous support.  
This paper first presents the core negotiation management levers of the host country 
and UNFCCC Secretariat. This is followed by a brief analysis of the role of national 
vested interests, the distribution of power, the effect that prior failure can have in 
building determination for a successful outcome at subsequent summits and in 
providing a framework for compromise.  
Each section includes a text box with a brief summary of the empirical evidence on 
the UN climate negotiations, gathered primarily from 55 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews averaging one hour in duration with senior negotiators from all coalitions, 
high-level UN officials and lead host organisers, as well as summit observers.  
For reasons of confidentiality the evidence is not attributed to individual interviewees. 
However, the aggregate numerical results are shown for each management factor.  
 
1. Core levers for managing multilateral negotiations  
 
1.1  Transparency and inclusiveness 
 
 
Scholars and practitioners of economic and environmental regimes have emphasised 
the importance of transparency and inclusiveness to successful negotiation outcomes 
(Köster, 2002; Mayr, 2002; Odell, 2009; Müller, 2011; Albin and Young, 2012; 
Davenport, Wagner et al., 2012). The empirical analysis presented in this paper is 
consistent with this and suggests that the organisers of UNFCCC Conference of 
Parties (COP) negotiations should consider the following to create a transparent and 
inclusive process.   
 
Creating a transparent process  
A key way in which the organisers from the host nation and UNFCCC Secretariat can 
improve transparency is by providing sufficient information on small group 
negotiations. These small group negotiations are an important part of large 
"The fact that we knew what was on the table [in Copenhagen] contributed to our 
agreement to the proposal."        
 Lead negotiator to UN climate negotiations, 2011. 
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multilateral negotiations. They reduce the complexity of having a high number of 
issues and parties. They often consist of between 20 to 60 negotiators only, which, if 
not properly managed, can leave other delegates feeling excluded. Transparency about 
the group’s mandate, schedule and participants is therefore crucial.  
Providing detailed information about the development of a compromise text further 
improves transparency. After tiring and demanding negotiations, this text is meant to 
enable agreement by satisfying the positions of as many parties as possible. Given its 
importance, the organisers need to raise awareness about the origin of the text, how it 
has evolved and the conclusions reached.  
Transparency is also improved by the organisers diligently providing the necessary 
information about the overall negotiation progress and schedule. At a COP summit, 
thousands of negotiators are scattered over many different formal and informal groups 
for two weeks. Very few participants have an overview of all the key moves that 
occur. This means that information on negotiation progress and the next steps is 
essential for delegates’ active involvement and buy-in. 
    
Creating an inclusive process  
Organisers improve the inclusivity of the negotiation processes by carefully designing 
the selection process for the small group negotiations. Countries want to participate in 
the most important small groups or at least be represented by other countries from 
their coalition. The organisers need to respond positively to this core demand. 
Aside from small group negotiations, negotiations occur in several different forums at 
different professional levels; from experts up to heads of state and government. These 
‘layers’ of negotiation require close integration to avoid the exclusion of delegations 
that, for instance, may not be represented at the leadership level.  
Organisers should engage in extensive deliberation on the different parties' proposals 
when facilitating compromise. They need to reach out broadly to countries in the run-
up to each summit to consider comprehensively all viewpoints.  
Finally, organisers can improve the perception of transparency and inclusiveness by 
'branding' negotiations as being transparent and inclusive. 
 
Transparency and inclusiveness contribute to a successful negotiation process in 
the following ways:   
• They increase the knowledge of negotiators about the negotiation process and 
content, thereby making them more confident about agreeing an outcome. 
Negotiators must have a clear understanding of the outcomes they are being 
asked to agree in a summit's final hours. This gives them the confidence to 
agree outcomes because it enables them to comprehensively report back to 
their governments on how the final agreement was reached. Alongside this, 
negotiators must also understand the negotiation process and feel it is 
legitimate. This promotes trust between parties and the host, which is vital in 
the turbulent and sometimes fractious environment of a summit. It also 
increases the acceptance of the final ruling on consensus by the summit 
President. 
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• They enhance parties' ability to contribute to a compromise and their ability 
to highlight their ‘must-have’ issues. This maximizes the input of different 
parties, helping to create a proposal that is acceptable to all. This can be 
critical in preventing more 'radical' parties from blocking the agreement. 
Finally, the ability to contribute increases negotiators’ commitment to the 
output and enhances their willingness to agree with it.  
• They diminish the likelihood of negotiations being obstructed on procedural 
grounds. Otherwise, delegates who are unsatisfied with a suggested outcome 
may use process as an instrument to block progress. They may try to 
undermine the organiser’s efforts and promote the view that the process lacks 
transparency and is not inclusive. By contrast, having a transparent and 
inclusive process can make the political ‘price’ for blocking negotiations too 
high. 
• They engender a sense of respectful treatment, which builds sympathy for 
the process and increases negotiators’ willingness to agree. This becomes even 
more important when political leaders are present. Politicians are accustomed 
to being treated in a respectful way and are therefore particularly sensitive to 
any behaviour that could be perceived as discourteous.      
 
 
 
 
Empirical evidence on the Danish and Mexican Presidencies: The evidence 
gathered here suggests that the Danish Presidency did not successfully create a 
transparent and inclusive negotiations process (100 percent of interviewees for this 
research said the process was not transparent; 97 percent found it was exclusive). 
The Danes had prepared a compromise draft behind the scenes, known as the 
'Danish text'. It infringed upon parties' prerogative to develop their own negotiation 
text. Moreover, the exclusive composition of the small group of 30 leaders that 
hammered out the final deal offended the excluded 90 heads of state and 
government. Following, what was regarded by many parties as a secretive final 
session that included only the United States and BASIC (China, India, Brazil, South 
Africa) coalition of countries, many of the excluded parties made vocal objections to 
their compromise draft on the grounds of process. As a result, the summit only ‘took 
note’ of the draft and ended in deadlock without agreement.    
Learning from Copenhagen, the Mexican Presidency and the UNFCCC Secretariat 
increased transparency and inclusiveness (76 percent of interviewees said the 
process at Cancun was transparent and 87 percent said it was inclusive). The 
organisers reached out widely to all countries, including those who had felt 
neglected at Copenhagen, such as the Latin American ALBA coalition (Venezuela, 
Nicaragua, Bolivia, etc.). The Mexicans refrained from drafting a compromise text 
and reiterated the mantra of ‘no Mexican text’. An open-door policy avoided the 
small closed circles that had irritated so many at Copenhagen in 2009. Parties 
could always join the small informal rounds on key outstanding issues under the 
facilitation of the organisers. The transparent and inclusive process overseen by the 
organisers was a key factor in the adoption of the Cancún Agreements. 
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1.2  Capability of organisers 
 
 
Research in the fields of Bureaucratic Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, and 
Transnational Studies indicates that bureaucracies and individuals influence the 
process and outcome of multilateral negotiations (Weber 1946; Allison 1971; Barnett 
and Finnemore 1999; Mitchell 2002; Depledge 2007; Biermann and Siebenhüner 
2009; Jinnah 2012). The empirical evidence in this study supports these approaches. It 
points at several core elements concerning the capability of organisers. 
 
Ensuring the high capability of organising institutions and individuals  
The organisers of negotiations play an important role in whether or not a successful 
outcome is reached. For international climate change negotiations, the ‘organisers’ are 
the responsible branch of the host country's government and the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
Within these institutions, individuals with key roles are the head of the Secretariat, the 
host country Minister as Conference President and his or her lead advisor. It is crucial 
that these institutions and individuals have high capability in a number of key areas.        
 
A high organisational, cultural and personal ‘fit’ to the specific negotiation 
circumstances is crucial. The organisational ‘fit’ of institutions requires, above all, the 
internal unity of the organising institution and clear responsibilities (for example, 
between the Climate Ministry and the Prime Minister's Office). Cultural ‘fit’, for 
instance, includes the ability of organisers to build bridges as a neutral facilitator. It 
also means not communicating in a manner that is perceived as too direct or dominant 
and being able to work behind-the-scenes to create an inviting and unthreatening 
atmosphere for negotiation. A successful personal ‘fit’ has been attributed to 
organisers that are, among other things, empathic, approachable, open to listen, 
modest and humorous, while still steering the negotiations with confidence.  
Organisers also need to possess a high level of expertise in the dynamics of 
negotiations and must have a facilitation 'toolkit' developed from lengthy experience 
in multilateral negotiations. By contrast, an in-depth prior knowledge of the content 
under negotiation does not appear to be a crucial factor.  
Finally, it is crucial to ensure good working relations between the Presidency and 
treaty Secretariat. While there may be lively debate about the appropriate negotiation 
management process among organisers, a generally non-competitive interaction 
between the principal facilitators without rivalry for publicity is essential for success. 
 
High capability of the organising institutions and individuals contributes to 
successful negotiation outcomes in the following ways: 
• The organisational fit and institutional alignment, (above all the internal unity 
of organisers) enhances organisers’ effectiveness by allowing the host 
country and UNFCCC Secretariat to focus all their resources on the facilitation 
"Speaking with two tongues as Presidency wasn’t helpful either. It created room for 
countries to play games with us."       
 Danish host organiser of climate negotiations, 2011. 
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of the negotiation process, rather than getting mired in their own disputes or 
misunderstandings. Animosities within the host government and with UN 
bureaucracy cost organisers valuable time. Indeed deep internal strife reduces 
the motivation of officials in the organising institutions. By contrast, a clear 
distribution of responsibilities and mutual trust between organising institutions 
empowers officials in their facilitation. Parties can then count on the word of 
an organiser and cannot exploit internal differences.  
• Process expertise and high cultural and personal ‘fit’ allow organizers to 
navigate the process of these complex and fragile negotiations in a 
sophisticated way. They enable them to find appropriate tools for a given 
situation. Having a high degree of empathy enables a good reading of critical 
situations. Knowledge of core process rules is also essential for the lead 
organiser. For example, when the Conference President leads parties through 
the heated debate in the final hours of the negotiations a comprehensive 
understanding of the process rules can make a decisive difference on whether 
a successful agreement is reached. Having a high level of negotiation process 
expertise also makes matching up original strategy with negotiation reality 
much more realistic and provides more flexibility to respond to potential 
deviations. Lastly, a dominant or ‘pushy’ facilitation style can undermine the 
perception of organiser neutrality, which devalues their core role as an 
unbiased facilitator.  
• High cultural and personal ‘fit’ also widens the access of organisers to 
parties. Showing empathy and being perceived as fair and understanding 
helps, as does cultural proximity/similarity. These cultural-personal factors 
can make negotiators more amenable to having a conversation and to sharing 
information with the organisers, which is essential for facilitation. By contrast 
parties can be made to feel alienated by the actions of organisers, perceiving 
them as disrespectful. This can make delegates hesitate or even refuse to 
engage with the organisers. Beyond the gathering of information from 
individual delegations by the organisers, wide access to delegations allows 
lead organisers to build bridges and forge compromises between parties who 
might otherwise not have exchanged views constructively.    
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1.3  Authority of the Conference President 
 
 
Scholarship on individual leadership indicates the influence of the authority held by 
the Conference President on negotiation outcomes, in addition to the capabilities of 
the organising institutions and its key individuals (Depledge 2005; Odell 2005; 
Tallberg 2010; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2011). The empirical evidence of this 
research highlights this factor. 
 
Empirical evidence on the Danish and Mexican Presidencies: The Danish 
Presidency was initially led by the Danish Minister for Climate and Energy. She 
and her team had a high level of expertise in the process and content of climate 
negotiations, as was reported by around 50 percent of interviewees for this study. 
However, intense rivalries between this team and the Prime Minister's Office broke 
out in the run-up to the summit, which Danish officials frankly conceded in 
interviews for this research afterwards. They led to the resignation of the principal 
adviser to the Danish Minister for Climate and Energy, only a few weeks before the 
summit. The new leading team of the Danish Prime Minister and his chief adviser 
had a much smaller network among negotiators and less multilateral negotiation 
experience, as close to 100 percent of respondents complained. The most revealing 
moment was the statement of the Prime Minister as Conference President in the 
crucial hours of the closing night of Copenhagen. It was observed by interviewees 
that, having called for a vote on the compromise proposal the Prime Minister 
acknowledged, in front of all delegates, that he did not know "your rules". Tensions 
between the Danish hosts and the assertive UNFCCC Executive Secretary 
aggravated the situation and inhibited a joint rescue of the summit. Respondents 
unanimously mentioned this non-alignment as a crucial driver of the summit's 
failure.  
This experience led the Mexican President to resolve rivalries among the ministries 
early on, as disclosed by Mexican officials for this research. He appointed the 
Foreign Minister as Conference President. She and her team received input on 
substance from the Environment Ministry. The Foreign Minister and her chief 
adviser mastered multilateral processes as seasoned diplomats. They had very 
empathic personalities with a non-directive attitude and sense of humour as was 
reflected almost unanimously by the interviewees, independent of their negotiation 
coalition. This fit of a 'high context culture' contrasts with the very direct and 
straightforward communication style of the Danish and gave the Mexicans wide 
access across negotiation groups to gain rich insights into the underlying 
motivations. This was essential to finding common ground. The relations between 
the host country and the UN were less conflictive under the new UNFCCC 
Executive Secretary in Cancún, as nearly 50 percent of interviewees indicated. Her 
cooperative behind-the-scenes support of the presidency contributed to Cancún's 
success. 
 
"Even though we didn't like some parts [of the final proposal] we said 'yes' due to 
the authority she had enjoyed amongst us."      
 Lead climate negotiator on the Mexican Conference President, 2011. 
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The importance of presidential authority  
A fundament role of the Conference President is moving negotiations forward and 
bringing them to a successful conclusion in their delicate final hours. To achieve this, 
their authority must be accepted among the large majority of key negotiators.  
The question is: how can the Conference President achieve this high level of authority 
and be trusted by delegates? Many negotiators base their trust in the Conference 
President on their perception of his or her capability and on the transparency and 
inclusiveness of the process he presides over. This shows how the levers of 
negotiation management interact.  
As regards ‘capability’, delegates develop trust when, for example, the President 
masters the process without serious violations of core rules and personally interacts 
with delegates in an open and amicable way. Maintaining neutrality as President is a 
‘must-have’ element in exercising this role.  
A transparent and inclusive process also further bolsters their authority. Parties gain 
trust in the facilitation of the organiser when they are kept informed about the key 
steps being taken and have an opportunity to offer their perspective. Being taken 
seriously and being heard play critical roles. Reaching out to negotiators through 
extensive travelling, for instance, can build personal relationships and trust.  
Overall, attaining a high level of authority is a fragile endeavour requiring a cautious 
and gradual build-up of political capital.       
 
The authority of the Conference President contributes to a successful negotiation 
outcome in the following ways: 
• Authority is gained by building trust. A Conference President who 
successfully builds trust produces goodwill among parties towards an 
agreement. Goodwill affects the scrutiny of the proposed text, so parties 
control their ‘target’ and ‘reservation’ points less strictly.1 Trust can lead to 
the conscious lowering of 'reservation points' to enable agreement, i.e. ceding 
on issues against their interests. Authority can therefore help to set aside some 
of the substantial rejections of a negotiating country and keep negotiations on 
track. Finally, authority affects how delegates treat procedural mistakes or 
contested decisions by the Conference President. The effect of this goodwill 
can be critical in the make-or-break moment of a closing plenary session, 
when much depends on whether delegates accept the Conference President's 
decisions.       
• Acceptance of the authority of the Conference President by parties empowers 
the President with sufficient leeway to take crucial decisions, for example, 
a decision based on the consensus view. Acceptance can be conveyed through 
standing ovations for Conference Presidents, which nurture the notion of 
support and offer sufficient emotional backing in a delicate moment. Public 
demonstrations of acceptance make the President feel strong enough to seize 
the opportunity to close a deal. 
• Where a Conference President successfully achieves a high level of authority, 
this reduces parties' potential to block agreement and so increases the 
1 Target point is what parties aim for as ideal pay-off in a negotiation. Reservation point is the lowest 
acceptable offer before they would 'walk away from the table'. 
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likelihood that agreement is reached. Authority affects the respect and caution 
with which negotiators interact with a Conference President. For example, 
parties are less likely to openly block the process if the President has 
competently dealt with procedural interventions so far. Interventions against a 
broadly trusted President would mean attacking an able and honest broker and 
so damage the reputation of the party attempting to block the process. By 
contrast, a President with a poor track record in this respect invites opposing 
parties to jeopardise his or her facilitation and block an agreement.   
 
 
 
1.4  Negotiation modes of constructive arguing versus positional 
bargaining 
 
 
Constructivist theory proposes that the negotiation mode (or style) of 'arguing' among     
parties encourages them to take interests and ideas more seriously in negotiations, 
Empirical evidence on the Danish and Mexican Presidencies: Some respondents 
suggested that the Danish Minister for Climate and Energy had gained a fair 
amount of trust as first President of the Copenhagen summit, but many remained 
undecided on how to rate her authority level. The trust in her was undermined by 
the leaking of the 'Danish text' in the first week of negotiations and the Presidency's 
reaction to it. With the start of the pivotal high-level segment of the conference 
(when political leaders arrived), the perceived 'disappearance' of the Minister for 
Climate and Energy and the takeover by the Danish Prime Minister proved 
disastrous. Only a few months into office, the Prime Minister lacked sufficient 
experience of major multilateral negotiations and showed insufficient empathy for 
the situation. All interviewees asserted that the authority of the Prime Minister soon 
diminished.  Delegates did not accept him in his role as Conference President, 
which deprived him of meaningful levers to steer the Copenhagen summit to an 
outcome that would be accepted by all parties. 
The Mexican Foreign Minister successfully achieved a high level of authority 
amongst the parties. Her comprehensive experience of multilateral negotiations and 
strong empathy quickly created trust among delegates, some of who still felt 
exasperated by the experience of Copenhagen. Interviewees reported that her open 
and inclusive style elicited palpable relief from negotiators during plenary sessions 
at Cancún. Her style increased goodwill which led parties to forgive process 
mistakes. The almost unanimous support for her (95 percent of interview 
respondents, across all coalitions, expressed support) culminated on Cancún's last 
day when negotiators responded with a standing ovation after she released the 
compromise text. This broad authority with all parties was pivotal when the Foreign 
Minister faced the sole opposition of Bolivia to the final package during the night of 
the closing plenary session. In what was a borderline decision to overrule the 
explicit objection of one party, she ruled by consensus on the adoption of the 
Cancún Agreements that the parties eventually accepted. 
 
 ″You try to understand each other. When bargaining, it is just a clash."  
   Chair of a UN climate negotiation Working Group, 2011. 
 
12 
 
   
thereby facilitating a final agreement (e.g. Haggard and Simmons 1987; Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993).  
Regime theory (Osherenko and Young 1993, 13; Mitchell 2010), conflict research 
(e.g. Wagner 2008) and general negotiation analysis (e.g. Sebenius 1992; Thompson 
2009) all underline the importance of negotiation modes.  
 
Enabling constructive arguing 
The negotiation mode (or style) of parties determines how interests and positions can 
be shaped by convincing concepts.  
If organisers are successful in enabling constructive 'arguing', this can make 
negotiators more open to a change of mind based on facts and logical insights. They 
are then generally ready to find a joint solution and reveal more of the interests 
underlying their positions. Such openness lets concepts enter the process more easily.  
By contrast, if organisers are unsuccessful in opening up spaces in the negotiations for 
constructive argument and debate, parties will often 'bargain' for the distribution of an 
assumed fixed set of gains and burdens in what they consider a ‘zero-sum’ situation. 
They merely state their positions without a willingness to engage in open-ended 
solution finding and often claim a restrictive negotiation mandate. 
Organisers can influence the negotiation mode of delegates in two ways. First (and as 
shown above), if negotiators trust the organising Presidency and UNFCCC 
Secretariat, they are less anxious about hidden agendas and secretive negotiations. 
This leads to more open-minded debate. In a situation where mistrust exists, many 
negotiators perceive it safer to close up and stick to their positions.  
Second, by establishing informal, non-public, settings for discussion between parties 
ahead of the main summit, organisers can facilitate an open exchange on interests and 
a truer discourse on negotiation content. By taking these discussions outside of the 
official negotiation process organisers provide arguing space without the pressure of 
having to agree an outcome. This increases the likelihood of compromise being 
reached at the summit. At summits, smaller informal groups fulfil a similar function 
by allowing parties to engage in constructive arguing outside of plenaries where well-
known positions are generally presented.  
Overall, informal settings need to be handled carefully as any exclusiveness can 
destroy the trust of non-participating parties. An appropriate middle ground needs to 
be found between efficiency and legitimacy.  
 
Constructive arguing contributes to a successful negotiation outcome in the 
following ways:   
• Constructive arguing lets negotiators mutually reveal information about the 
interests which underlie their positions. This leads to a better understanding 
of positions and interests, including the ‘reservation’ points of parties, and 
helps to identify where agreement can be reached.  In doing so, constructive 
argument leads to outcomes where all sides gain optimum benefit. The 
enhanced trust from this process of interest sharing also adds to a willingness 
to reach mutual agreement.   
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• Constructive arguing allows negotiators to provide more rationales and 
factual information behind possible solutions when they advocate and 
mutually consider their proposals. By contrast, negotiators often do not fully 
understand each other's suggestions when they merely attempt to bargain. This 
lack of understanding frequently inhibits the development of a joint solution 
for the complex problems being considered.  
• Constructive arguing lets negotiators comprehensively consider all interests 
which underlie the positions of parties. While this at first costs valuable time, 
it ultimately improves efficiency and effectiveness. The comprehensive 
consideration of issues allows parties to trade concessions more easily. Their 
selection and prioritisation using a more integrative approach takes the 
diversity of interests into account and makes agreement, with maximum 
benefits for all sides, much likelier.  
• Constructive arguing opens negotiators to new solutions and compromises. 
It often nurtures a readiness to deviate from national negotiation mandates and 
to lower the threshold of reservation points, which widens the scope for 
compromise. Moreover, the positive momentum gained by assuming a ‘win-
win’ situation through constructive argument and debate encourages parties to 
find common ground, as they can see there is a much a lower risk attached to 
accepting a compromise. 
 
 
Empirical evidence on the Danish and Mexican Presidencies: While parties 
argued more constructively during preparations for the Copenhagen summit (such 
as the informal Greenland Dialogue), they switched to more conflictive bargaining 
at the summit itself. This was highlighted in research interviews by many 
respondents. Parties were fighting for their positions in a high pressure situation 
fearing they could lose out in a far-reaching agreement. Very little progress was 
made until the high-level segment (with ministers and heads of state and 
government) opened. By contrast, research interview respondents noted that the US 
and BASIC countries argued more constructively in their exclusive small group 
meeting on the last day and achieved at least a political compromise on core issues. 
However, their last-minute proposal reached the other parties too late, and their 
delegates were offended by the lack of transparency and apparent exclusivity of the 
process.  
During the Mexican Presidency, the organisers emphasised the use of substantive 
and frank exchanges between parties to enable constructive argument. They 
convened informal consultations on pivotal issues, such as on finance and on the 
monitoring of commitments, in the year ahead of the Cancún summit. Based on the 
same principle of enhancing understanding between groups and generating ideas, 
informal exchanges such as the Petersberg Dialogue also allowed open debate. In 
the research interviews conducted for this study, negotiators described how the 
conciliatory spirit of debate during preparations continued into the Cancún summit 
itself. In its second week, the inclusive consultations on core issues, led by ministers 
from developing and developed countries, contributed to constructive dialogue 
which revealed the different interests of respective parties. As research interview 
respondent asserted, these consultations helped parties to open up to each other 
and be more open about the interests underlying their positions, rather than merely 
fighting for greater gain or avoidance of costs in a ‘tit-for-tat’ fashion.  
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Empirical evidence on Danish and Mexican presidencies: The analysis that 
informs this paper found that parties’ interests remained mostly constant between 
Copenhagen and Cancún. The nature of stakes involved was so fundamental that 
interests did hardly change within one year: the tremendous global environmental, 
economic and social risks of climate change stand against the stellar challenge to 
fairly distribute the economic burden of mitigation and adaptation. The existential 
conditions of climate change and the respective domestic political constellations 
remained broadly unchanged for both the key large and small countries from 2009 
to 2010. Therefore they cannot be used to explain the varying negotiation results. 
 
 
2 Context factors beyond negotiation management  
2.1 Interests of countries 
Even where negotiations are organised extremely well, the interests of countries are a 
key determinant of the negotiation outcome: even a perfect process cannot convince 
parties to act against their interests.  
Nevertheless, it is often the case that the interests of parties neither fully converge nor 
entirely collide. In cases where there is a narrow overlap of interests, effective 
negotiation management fosters the converging of positions. Organisers can, for 
instance, widen the agreement ‘zone’ by facilitating the creation of new options or 
leading parties to redefine their preferences.  
Again, therefore, effective negotiation management can help to facilitate agreement, 
even where the negotiation position of parties are not completely compatible. This is 
even more important in the consensus-based decision-making context of many UN 
negotiations. The consensus requirement is different from many other negotiation fora 
as in this case parties cannot easily reach majorities through coalition building or by 
neglecting dissenting countries who are not needed for an agreement.  
 
 
2.2  Distribution of power  
Besides interests, the distribution of power between countries naturally plays a critical 
role in negotiations. Agreement is difficult to achieve without the support of the most 
powerful countries at the negotiating table, such as the US or China. However, even 
the support of the major powers can be insufficient to ensure an agreement in a 
consensus-based system. The rejection by small-to-middle sized countries can cause a 
compromise proposal to fail.  
At the same time, small-to-middle sized countries can create important dynamics 
through constructive engagement. They exert a form of collective pressure through 
convincing discourse which can bring opposed or neutrally-minded countries on 
board. Overall, the allegedly 'weaker' countries can thus have a significant impact on 
the result of the negotiations.  
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2.3  Prior failure and 'stepping stone' to agreement 
The failure of past negotiations to reach an agreement can ratchet up the pressure for 
an agreement to be reached at a subsequent summit. The fear that further failure could 
lead to the negotiation process 'dying' has the effect of galvanising commitment to 
reach an agreement, particularly amongst smaller countries who fear that the ‘death’ 
of the UNFCCC process will cause negotiations to move to smaller meetings of 
powerful countries that will be beyond their influence.  
A 'stepping stone effect', whereby compromises made at a past ‘failed’ summit 
provide a framework for agreement at future summits, can be observed in 
international climate change negotiations. This effect often stretches over at least two 
rounds of negotiations. A detailed rejected proposal may even be available as an 
orienting framework and blueprint for an eventual agreement.  
Finally, prior failure can enhance mutual knowledge about the 'red lines' that cannot 
be crossed for negotiations to succeed and increases the likelihood of an agreement 
being reached.   
 
 
3. Conclusion 
Wider research on the regimes of trade and biosafety reveals striking parallels in the 
dynamics of environmental and economic negotiations: they all demonstrate that 
Empirical evidence on Danish and Mexican presidencies: All principal countries 
supported the final climate compromise in Copenhagen, which had been crafted by 
the US and the BASIC group, as the largest emerging economies. Notwithstanding 
this late but unanimous coalition of great powers the summit only ‘took note’ of 
their suggestion. Despite very similar power structures, parties adopted the 
agreement in Cancún one year later. So, 'power' alone cannot explain why it had 
not been adopted already in Copenhagen where all large powers had already 
agreed on a compromise. The bridge-building activities of the subsequent 
Cartagena Dialogue of like-minded developed and developing countries added to 
this success. 
Empirical evidence on Danish and Mexican Presidencies: The presumption was 
that the initial round of climate negotiations at Copenhagen would achieve a 
convergence of interest, asserted many respondents in interviews for this research. 
In fact it ended in stalemate as no comprehensive climate agreement was reached. 
Many respondents also conceded that the widely-reported failure to reach 
agreement had raised the public pressure on subsequent negotiations to succeed. 
They further described that the failure also served as a warning to them that the 
established multilateral negotiation forum was under threat. Regarding the 
'stepping stone' effect, negotiation teams had worked for long hours in Copenhagen 
to resolve many details. Leaders eventually crafted the political compromise of the 
Copenhagen Accord. Many negotiators underlined in the research interviews how 
they could build on this foundation to reach agreement in Cancún.  
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effective negotiation management significantly enhances cooperation and, in 
doing so, contributes to a successful process and outcome, from climate change 
talks at the summit in Cancún, to trade negotiations in Doha in 2001 (Jawara and Kwa 
2003; Odell 2009; Bayne and Woolcock 2011), and biosafety negotiations in 
Montreal in 2000 (Bail, Falkner et al. 2002; Chasek and Wagner 2012).  
The key factors that contribute to a successful negotiation process and outcome are:    
• A largely transparent and inclusive process  
• Highly capable lead organisers and institutions  
• A Conference President with high authority 
• A negotiation environment that facilitates arguing over bargaining as the 
negotiation mode.  
By contrast, poor negotiation management can be a contributing factor in the collapse 
of negotiations, from climate change in Copenhagen to the breakdowns of the trade 
and biosafety negotiations in Seattle and Cartagena respectively in 1999.  
These summits either completely failed to reach agreement or reached a political 
agreement only that was not accepted by all parties. The results cost many countries 
dearly in environmental, economic, and social terms.  
The negotiation management 'best practices’ presented in this policy paper is intended 
to contribute to the future facilitation of multilateral cooperation.  
In case of interest, please contact the author, Dr Kai Monheim, for any questions and 
further details (email:k.monheim@lse.ac.uk), or refer to the book Monheim, Kai 
(November, 2014), How Effective Negotiation Management Promotes Multilateral 
Cooperation: The Power of Process in Climate, Trade, and Biosafety Negotiations, 
Routledge.  
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